NB: THIS TRANSCRIPT WAS TYPED FROM A TRANSCRIPTION UNIT RECORDING AND NOT COPIED FROM AN ORIGINAL SCRIPT: BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF MIS-HEARING AND THE DIFFICULTY, IN SOME CASES OF IDENTIFYING INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS, THE BBC CANNOT VOUCH FOR ITS ACCURACY. ...................................................... PANORAMA “CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS” RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1 DATE: 9:02:03 ....................................................... JANE CORBIN: Vienna Airport last November, the start of a journey into unknown territory. Physicist Jacques Baute headed a team of nuclear experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency travelling to Baghdad. I was with them. The UN Inspectors had agreed to let Panorama follow them over the coming weeks. There was an air of anticipation but also a big question mark hanging over their mission. Would they be able to prevent a war, or would they just delay it? On board with Jacques Baute was Demetrius Perricos who would lead the UN search for missiles and biological and chemical weapons. The inspectors were already feeling the political pressure. They knew they wouldn't be given much time. CORBIN: How are you feeling about it? TOM: Excited but also nervous, but enthusiastic for the mission. I think it's a very important mission. I think that if we can go the places that we need to go to, to do the things we need to do, that we can help maybe prevent a war. CORBIN: It's going to be tough on the team. JACQUES BAUTE: It will be tough on the team. It will be tough for probably at least 6 months. In other words, we are not going to have many days of leave or things like that. CORBIN: And you think you're going to be there for six months? You don’t think that American pressure in the interim will actually take us towards war? BAUTE: You know, the political decision of.. you know.. going to military action or letting inspections go on is not ours. CORBIN: This is the inside story of the last three months chasing Saddam's weapons. Iraqis traditionally welcome foreign guests with a meal of fish from the Tigris River. The day after my arrival in Baghdad I was summoned to meet two of the most important officials in the Iraqi regime - General Amer el Saadi, a British trained engineer once headed the country's chemical weapons programme. Now he's an adviser to President Saddam Hussein. General Hussein Mohammed Amin heads the team responsible for proving that Iraq no longer has forbidden weapons programmes. These officials had promised me I could visit suspect sites and talk to scientists. They wanted to convince me Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction. The West still doesn't seem to believe Iraq, there's still this feeling you're hiding something, that you're not really laying out your cards on the table. General AMER AL-SAADI Presidential Advisor Well how else can they justify their military build up? They must portray things as not being satisfactory, that Iraq is holding back, Iraq is hiding things. How else can they justify their actions to their public? If we have something we would produce it. We'll be happy to produce it to get rid of it and get done – but we don't. We don’t. What do we do? CORBIN: For years I had heard about Iraq's notorious weapon sites, researched and reported on what had gone on there. Now I was arriving at a remote spot in the desert outside Baghdad, once the centre of Saddam Hussein's germ warfare programme. I was escorted by my minder, the official from the Ministry of Information who must accompany ever film crew at all times, and another Iraqi who turned out to be personally acquainted with this place. So, this is…. MINDER: This was El Hakam site. CORBIN: This was El Hakam. MINDER: Yes, because you have seen there is no El Hakam site here. CORBIN: Were you working here? MINDER: Yes, I was responsible for the production of anthrax. CORBIN: You were responsible? MINDER: Yes. CORBIN: Ah, well I didn't realise that. MINDER: Yes. CORBIN: So this was Iraq's main biological weapons site. MINDER: Yes, that's right. CORBIN: And what was produced here? MINDER: It was used for the production of Biological agents which included bacillus anthracis spores. CORBIN: Anthrax. MINDER: Yes, anthrax. Clostridium botulinum toxin. CORBIN: Botulinum toxin, yes. MINDER: perfringen spores. That's it. CORBIN: So a big variety of weapons here. MINDER: Just the three, no more. CORBIN: That's enough. MINDER: Yes. CORBIN: After the Gulf War in 1991 the UN forced Iraq to disarm and accept inspection teams. They visited Al Hakam repeatedly. For four years the Iraqis lied, denying they had a germ warfare programme. They dumped the evidence, the bombs, in a nearby river, and they hid documents, records of what they'd produced. It took a defector to reveal where to look. Thousands of tons of toxins which suffocate their victims and cause liver cancer were eventually found and destroyed. The inspectors made sure Al Hakam could never again be used to produce biological weapons. Today Al Hakam lies abandoned. But the Iraqis have still not explained what happened to over 8,000 litres of anthrax, tons of growth medium to culture bacteria, and many thousands of munitions filled with biological agents. There was one Iraqi scientist who masterminded the bio warfare programme at Al Hakam and the cover-up. I wanted to meet the woman the inspectors nicknamed 'Dr Germ'. Dr Rihab Taha has never spoken publicly before. She met me accompanied by several officials at the ministry responsible for proving Iraq has destroyed its forbidden weapons. Dr Taha learnt her scientific skills in a British university. Can I ask you a little bit about your history. Where did you train and what do you remember of those days? Dr RIHAB TAHA Well I did my PhD in England, in the University of East Anglia in Norwich City, and that was from 1980 to 1984. CORBIN: And what did you study? TAHA: I studied bacterial toxin, phytopathogenic toxin. CORBIN: That's toxins in plants is it? TAHA: Infected plants.. infected plants, yes. CORBIN: Dr Taha's British education was put to use testing lethal toxins on animals and, some suspect, on people. She became head of the germ warfare programme. Are you ashamed of what you did in those years when you were working on the biological weapons programme for Iraq? TAHA: No, not at all. No, because you know we are under a threat of different sides and different enemy so I think it is our right to be able to defend ourselves and to have something as a deterrent. CORBIN: So even though you were producing toxins and bacteria that could kill hundreds of thousands of people… TAHA: Well we never have this intension to use it. We never want to cause harm or damage to anybody. CORBIN: Are you doing any research work anymore on pathogens, biological agents? TAHA: No. Now my work is just from the administrative point of view. CORBIN: Saddam Hussein developed his weapons of mass destruction to give him power in his region, and as he showed in 1988 he was prepared to unleash poison gas against his own people to crush internal dissent and ensure his regime's survival. It raised the question would Saddam ever reveal what had happened to his forbidden weapons. Would he not gamble everything and try and keep them? November 12, 2002. United Nations, New York CORBIN: I arrived in New York to meet the Weapons Inspectors just a few days after they'd received their orders to return to Iraq. Their predecessors had spent seven years uncovering and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Their mission had ended before they completed their task. Now, under the leadership of a quiet Swedish diplomat, Dr Hans Blix, they were going back. Can you do this? Can you get to the bottom of what Iraq is up to? Dr HANS BLIX Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC Well we've been preparing ourselves since the early year 2000, so we have a lot of trained people, we have also analysed a lot of the things from the past. So if we are not prepared now, I think we will never be prepared. CORBIN: America was threatening war against Iraq, but the UN passed a unanimous resolution. Dr Blix and Mohamed El Baradei of the IAEA was set the task of verifying if Iraq had breached its promise to abandon its weapons of mass destruction. KOFI ANNAN Secretary General of the United Nations Resolution 1441 was extremely important, not only was it passed by the council but every member of the council voted for it and sent a unanimous message to Saddam Hussein that he must disarm. CORBIN: The French-led UN opposition to America's plans for regime change in Iraq. The Bush administration, at Britain's urging, reluctantly backed the resolution on inspections. But hawks with influence in Washington were already undermining Dr Blix. RICHARD PERLE Chairman, Defence Policy Review Board He was not our first choice, that's well known. He was the first choice of the French. I have never thought that Dr Blix was sufficiently aggressive in getting at the truth. I think he's much too concerned about Saddam Hussein's sensitivities. Saddam is not a sensitive man. CORBIN: You must be aware that there are mutterings amongst some elements in the American administration, what you might call the hawks, saying are you tough enough for the job, are you up to it, are you the man for the moment? BLIX: Well the proof of every pudding is in the eating so I think they will have to see what I do, or else they will eat me (laughs). CORBIN: The Weapons Inspectors of UNMOVIC had few people and limited resources. They knew they'd have to depend on friendly governments with their much vaunted intelligence dossiers to have a real chance of finding Saddam's weapons. The British government seems pretty sure that Saddam Hussein still has chemical and biological weapons, has produced more recently and is trying to get a nuclear bomb. BLIX: Well we are asked to provide facts to the Security Council and the best way of doing that is through inspections, what we see. I read this as totally as I read the intelligence reports but frequently they simply state that intelligence tells us this, or intelligence shows that etc. Fine, it may all be true. I mean I meet some of these people and I have the greatest respect for them. I know they do a necessary job. But simply saying that "intelligence shows.." is not evidence. CORBIN: The UN inspectors opened up their old headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad. The inspectors were there to verify that weapons programmes banned since the Gulf War had not restarted, and that former UN sites were empty. But the resolution made it clear it was up to Iraq to come clean if they were hiding weapons of mass destruction. TARIQ AZIZ Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq When you listen to Bush and Blair they tell Iraq has weapons of mass destruction; Iraq has to declare weapons of mass destruction; the Onus is on Iraq – and this is not fair. This is not logical. The onus is not on Iraq. The onus is on the accuser. Who is accusing Iraq, he has to prove his case. CORBIN: The hunt began on November 27th. The Inspectors' plan was to begin by checking hundreds of sites, factories, laboratories and military areas, places which they had been to before, and which had been involved in suspicious activity in the past. BAUTE: The first day was absolutely crazy. We were three cars of ours, six or seven on the Iraqi side, and probably thirty of forty cars trying to compete who would get photo of us, that was an interesting challenge. CORBIN: What did you actually do? How did you organise these expeditions so the Iraqis wouldn't be forewarned that you were coming? JACQUES BAUTE Chief Weapons Inspector International Atomic Energy Agency As the Chief Inspector I was the only one having in mind where we were going. I would inform the team members the evening before, by signs, not speaking, because we always take care… CORBIN: In case you're bugged. BAUTE: Exactly. We don’t know the status of the rooms. CORBIN: Each morning as the Inspectors set out in convoys Iraqi officials, equipped with communications kit, were hard on their heels. They were trying to work out where the Inspectors were going and give the sites advance warning. DEMETRIUS PERRICOS Chief Weapons Inspector, UNMOVIC In the cars that follow us they had people who were constantly on the telephone or the radio, and they are saying okay, we passed this particular mile, so the sites which are let's say five miles back, it's fine, they can be released. For the sites that are in front, they're all on high alert, that there is still a very good probability that the inspectors are going to visit it. They already have in all the sites that they know. CORBIN: On the 6th day, however, the Inspectors seem to have flustered the Iraqis when they arrived unexpectedly from two different directions at one of Saddam's palaces in Baghdad. In the past the inspectors lacked the powers to enter these so- called presidential sites. For Demetrius Perricos and Jacques Baute it was a test of their powers to go anywhere, any time. After a brief wait the gates were opened and the inspectors descended on the Palace. PERRICOS: They were surprised. They were surprised because they didn't think that we would go so early to one of those presidential sites. CORBIN: What happened? PERRICOS: Well we went in of course and we split the work and we started going through. One team went over to the side buildings, another team went over to the main building. CORBIN: Demetrius Perricos, a veteran of past inspections, knew from defectors that important documents and computer records had been hidden in Saddam's huge palaces before. PERRICOS: We've tried to see whether you can find the computer which, strange enough there was no computer there. But when we were down in the kitchens and we started looking at the refrigerators, which we did, we found the marmalades. CORBIN: Jars of marmalade, jam, sweetmeats. PERRICOS: Jars of marmalades, everything that you can imagine. CORBIN: But didn't you feel a bit foolish that you'd gone looking for biological weapons and all you found was marmalade? PERRICOS: Not really, because part of the job is you look if you want to find. CORBIN: Saddam Hussein was publicly welcoming the Inspectors to Iraq, urging his officials to assist them in their work. But his propaganda machine was busy, the state-controlled media calling them the "Un spies". I took a stroll in a Baghdad market to see what people really thought. Perhaps, surprisingly, a former director of Iraqi Airways who'd lived in London was suddenly on hand to give me his views of how the inspections were going. EX DIRECTOR, IRAQI AIRWAYS: Up to now there is nothing serious up to now. CORBIN: But do you think, though, that that will avoid war even if they find nothing, or what do you think will happen? EX DIRECTOR: This depends the policy of America. They want.. seeking for a reason. CORBIN: You think they're looking for a reason for war? EX DIRECTOR: Yes, yes. CORBIN: What do people think about the UN coming here and going everywhere, looking for weapons of mass destruction? The stall holder was more suspicious? STALL HOLDER: [translated] It's a violation. We consider it to be spying. They're leading the spying activity in this country. They did their inspections before and left so what are they doing back here? They are inspecting areas which have no weapons. CORBIN: The Inspectors were telling me, as they worked through all the old familiar sites around Iraq, that they had little hope of finding anything, without, that is, some help from the real spying experts. The CIA had produced reports claiming they knew from secret sources Iraq was hiding forbidden weapons. And last autumn the British government had produced its own intelligence dossier. I'm on my way to Al Dara, it's a vaccine laboratory which British intelligence in their dossier have called "a facility of concern". They suspect it of being involved in Iraq's research and biological warfare programme. The spook suspicions had been aroused by a recent Iraqi application for a license to restart vaccine production at Al Dara. Could it be a cover for a new and secret programme to make other deadly bugs? Al Dara was disabled six years ago by the previous UN inspectors. I found it shut and empty. There was, of course, another helpful Iraqi official, Al Dara's former director waiting to take me on a tour. So is this laboratory as it was left by the United Nations before or have you been rebuilding it at all? OFFICIAL: No, no. No rebuilding. This remain like this after they destroy all the equipment. So we leave it without any repairing. CORBIN: And is there any production here at all? OFFICIAL: No, no, no, no. No productions at all now. It is from the 96 until now we don’t produce anything here, it's as you see it. CORBIN: Have the Weapons Inspectors been back here to Al Dara in recent weeks to inspect it, and did they… OFFICIAL: At the second day when they are here they visit this place. CORBIN: And what did they find? OFFICIAL: Nothing, and I said there is nothing here. CORBIN: The inspectors knew that this ruined laboratory wasn't likely to be in use again. They were more interested in whether specialised equipment had disappeared. But their American critics dismissed their repeated visits to known sites. RICHARD PERLE Chairman, Defence Policy Review Board I think the weapons inspections are going in a predictable way. That is to say they are not finding anything because the inspectors don’t know where to look and Iraq is a big country, and until there is a clear declaration from Saddam and a full and truthful accounting, there is really little that the Inspectors can do. CORBIN: To the untrained eye at least Al Dara was clearly non operational. But what about the testimony from Iraqi defectors that germ labs were now hidden in the back of lorries? The suspicion of the British and the Americans is that it doesn't matter if this laboratory isn't being used because Iraq now has mobile laboratories. You've taken the things you had here and you move them around the country all the time so it's impossible to find them. OFFICIAL: Everything they are here, everything from this place they are here, still here, so what they destroy they destroy, and when they're remaining they are remaining here. CORBIN: So nothing from here moved. OFFICIAL: Nothing. No. CORBIN: As the weeks wore on the inspectors were becoming increasingly frustrated. While American critics complained they were ineffective the US and Britain too were reluctant to hand over their secret information. Dr HANS BLIX Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC We want to have intelligence about sites to visit. It's alright and it's interesting and important to be informed that they draw conclusions that Iraqis have done this or that, but we are inspectors and they have to be in the geography somewhere. They have to go some places. So we'd like to know are there some places you'd suggest us to go for good reasons? CORBIN: And they haven't told you those places? BLIX: No, no, I think that will come, I hope so, if they have them. I hope they have them. CORBIN: At the beginning of December came the first test of Saddam Hussein's intentions. Under the UN resolution Iraq was required to submit it's declaration. A full and final account of what had happened to it's weapons of mass destruction. There had been debate in Saddam's highest council about how open they should be. The 12,000 page document arrived at the Canal Hotel two days early in piles of boxes. But would the Inspectors, waiting in New York and Vienna, find Iraq had provided any new information to add to what they'd given the UN in previous years? JACQUES BAUTE Chief Weapons Inspector International Atomic Energy Agency The first reaction was simply to try to get in the first 30 seconds a feeling of what it was. What matters could be a small paragraph added here or there, so that's why we cannot draw any conclusion before we have every single word. CORBIN: So it will take a few days, perhaps even weeks, to really get a measure of it. BAUTE: We're working I can almost say days and night, and when I say 'we' it includes the translators for instance, so that we get a good flavour of what to say.. what to tell the council next week. CORBIN: In New York at the United Nations UNMOVIC's Inspectors, specialists in missiles and chemical and biological weapons laboured for a week through stacks of paper. Dr Blix was telling me he still had many questions about missing anthrax and VX, a deadly nerve gas – a drop can kill. The head of UNMOVIC had warned the Iraqis to answer truthfully and told them they didn't have much time to do so. But Dr Blix's people searched in vain for hard information in the Iraqi declaration. One told me the huge document was no more than a pile of garbage recycled from past documents they produced many years ago. BLIX: What Iraq needs to do is to show evidence that they have finished their weapons programme, that they actually destroyed weapons, and until they do that there will not be the confidence arising in them. They are a well organised country and if you produce scud missiles or you produce anthrax, you keep track of it and you have records of that, you will have reports given to it, you have individuals who have dealt with it. And therefore, it seems to me, that it would not be impossible for them to do so, and of course the suspicion arises that if they don’t do that, they have actually kept something. CORBIN: The Inspectors knew that Saddam Hussein's regime had failed a crucial test. Their chances of uncovering what had happened to the missing items were diminishing. Iraq was now on notice as far as the American Government and its British ally at the UN were concerned. Sir JEREMY GREENSTOCK UK Ambassador to the United Nations The silences are eloquent. They have not wanted to explain what we have fairly strong evidence they are still holding and the onus is on Iraq to explain those silences under the resolutions and it's a huge disappointment to the UK which wants to resolve this whole thing without the use of force that the declaration has not been used as an opportunity to do that. CORBIN: There had been debate amongst the top figures in the American administration about what should constitute a breach of Iraq's obligations serious enough to trigger war. The US decided to warn Iraq that snubbing the Inspectors with a less than truthful declaration was in itself a cause for military action. COLIN POWELL: Iraq's response is a catalogue of recycled information and flagrant omissions. It should be obvious that the pattern of systematic holes and gaps in Iraq's declaration is not the result of accidents or editing oversights or technical mistakes. These are material omissions that in our view constitute another material breach. General AMER AL-SAADI Presidential advisor That's absolute nonsense. The declarations were truthful and complete. Allegations to the contrary are the same as the allegations about the Blair document and the CIA report in which it was said that Iraq had resumed.. prescribed activities and harbouring weapons of mass destruction. None of this is true. Also the reference to gaps in the declaration is just not true. There are no gaps. CORBIN: Saddam Hussein was courting war while America was very publicly building up its forces on his doorstep. And Britain too announced it was sending troops and aircraft to the Gulf. GREENSTOCK: This is actually for real, but it's being done in a way which can be switched off if Saddam Hussein decides to comply 100% and hand all his stuff in. So he's got his hand on the switch actually, and if he declines to use it, then the military machine will roll onward as it's being prepared now. But he's got to come forward credibly with all those explanations - with the materials behind them that are gaps in the declaration - now. CORBIN: The military build up in late December increased the uncertainty of the UN mission. The Chief Inspectors admitted it underlined the vulnerability of their people in the field. BAUTE: The last thing we want to happen is to have them caught in dramatic events. CORBIN: Caught when the bombs start falling? BAUTE: Caught when the bombs start, caught with a possible and predictable reaction. CORBIN: You mean held as human shields or something by the Iraqis. BAUTE: Maybe, you know history shows UN staff are usually well protected. However, in some instances they've been used as human shields and when you have your own people there it's definitely something that crosses your mind. CORBIN: In January the pressure was mounting on the UN inspectors to produce a smoking gun. I'm on my way to Al Tuwaitha. It was the site of Iraq's secret nuclear weapons programme before the Gulf War. Since November the UN Inspectors have been back to Al Tuwaitha repeatedly, trying to find out if Iraq has restarted it's bomb programme. US intelligence agencies had accused Saddam Hussein of continuing work to build a nuclear bomb, and the British insisted he was trying to procure enriched uranium to do it. These accusations, if proved, were most likely to trigger a war to topple his regime before it acquired these strategic weapons. Previous inspectors had discovered industrious scientists developing all stages of the bomb and the raw material to the warhead design at Al Tuwaitha – the Los Alamos of Iraq. Tuwaitha is like a small city. There seem to be buildings, administrative headquarters, looks like a self-contained town. Vast earthworks surround the massive site, much of it in ruins today. Once more there was a welcoming committee and another guided tour in prospect. OFFICIAL: The site was the nuclear research site.. the main nuclear research site in Iraq. CORBIN: And today, what activities go on here? OFFICIAL: General activities concerning research on material, agriculture and biology. CORBIN: So for peaceful purposes only. OFFICIAL: For sure. CORBIN: And how many times have the UN inspectors been to Tuwaitha this time? OFFICIAL: The inspection team have been visiting the site eleven times. CORBIN: Eleven times? OFFICIAL: Yes nine since 27 of November. CORBIN: So in not even two months they've been here eleven times. OFFICIAL: Yes, you are right. CORBIN: Al Tuwaitha bears the scars of the world's determination to halt Saddam's nuclear ambitions. The Israel's bombed the first reactor here 22 years ago. And American planes crippled the second reactor in 1991. The Inspectors are aware that new activities not only nuclear but perhaps biological too could emerge from the ashes of Al Tuwaitha. The Iraqis were very anxious to show me round a brand new building, an experience that hovered on the brink of farce. OFFICIAL: The farm is nearby, nearby the building, and now they are cleaning it and… it's a small, small farm related to the agricultural directorate here in IAEC. CORBIN: But the problem is that last time Iraq denied that it had any of these weapons of mass destruction. You made all sorts of excuses, and then after the war it was discovered that you did have all these programmes. So this time people feel there's still a lack of credibility. OFFICIAL: This is good credibility, it's in front of you, you can see it. You can see it. Do you think that this is a mass of destruction weapons? CORBIN: No, it looks like mushrooms now, but how do we know what's been happening here before? OFFICIAL: You can test it. CORBIN: It's easy to… OFFICIAL: No, no, the inspection teams they used the latest technology they have and even it's clear it's a mushroom and you can test it. If you don’t believe go and test it. CORBIN: So why did the inspectors come and look at the mushrooms then if nothing's going on here? They had their suspicions. OFFICIAL: Yes, and even they looked everywhere. For example they went to universities, to college. CORBIN: Yes, but why did they look at the mushrooms? Why did they come to this building? OFFICIAL: You should ask them why they are so interested this building. They have visited this building twice since they returned back. CORBIN: The UN weapons inspectors know full well that laboratories can be used to culture other things than mushrooms. And Iraq has used what it claimed were food production facilities before to secretly develop biological weapons. The problem for Iraq is that in the past you've said you didn't have weapons of mass destruction and hen they were discovered. You lack credibility. You yourself even said you didn't have them in the past. So the world says well why should we believe you this time? TARIQ AZIZ Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq No, when the inspectors came, madam, when the inspectors came in 1991 we didn't say that we don’t have weapons of mass destruction. Chemical we did have, long range missiles we did have. We did have a nuclear programme. We didn't have nuclear weapons, but we did have a nuclear programme, we confessed that to UNSCOM and to the IAEA. As regards the biological area, we revealed all the facts to UNSCOM after 1995. CORBIN: But it took years. AZIZ: It took years because why, why? CORBIN: Because you didn't put it all on the table to begin with. AZIZ: Who is to blame for that? Who is to blame for that? CORBIN: Mr Aziz had conveniently forgotten that after the Gulf War Iraq never revealed any significant weapons until the Inspectors found them. The UN inspectors told me in January they would change their strategy and make surprise visits to places they'd never been before. The Chief Inspector had brought new information back from his Christmas break. Nervous security officials kept the press outside another presidential compound in Baghdad. The Inspectors were inside looking for documents. The arrival of Demetrius Perricos in Baghdad has signalled a new phase in the weapons inspections and will target a more direct approach. Intelligence has been handed over by the United Kingdom and I've been told that the Weapons Inspectors are hoping for a breakthrough in the search for weapons of mass destruction. The Inspectors knew this was the headquarters of Saddam's special security force, believed by western intelligence to be responsible for concealing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. They found only an armoury of guns, but Iraqi unease was a signal the leadership was feeling the pressure. Does the President Saddam Hussein feel the pressure on the country, on himself? AZIZ: Of course. He is the leader of Iraq. When there is a pressure on his country he is the first person to feel the pressure. But President Saddam Hussein is a very strong and courageous person. He will not bow to pressure. CORBIN: That evening I went to the Canal Hotel to talk to Demetrius Perricos about the Inspectors new strategy and the Iraqi reaction to it. DEMETRIUS PERRICOS Chief Weapons Inspector, UNMOVIC They are afraid that something may be found, maybe new style of doing inspections. No longer at only declared sites, and they don’t know to which site we will go. They don’t know what information we will have. They don’t know what sort of buildings or people we are going to try to speak or to try to enter. CORBIN: A quiet Baghdad suburb became the next target in the Inspectors' search for evidence. British intelligence had tipped the inspectors off that documents relating to the nuclear programme would be hidden here in a private home. When I visited Dr Faleh Hassan Hamza I found him still smarting at the Inspectors' visit. Dr FALEH HASSAN HAMZA They search the house room by room. They went to the bedroom of my wife. She was sleeping in the bed and they are searching in her private things. CORBIN: Then Dr Hamza was asked to open a locked junk room upstairs. There was something else there. Dr KAY MERRISH Weapons Inspector, UNMOVIC It was a manmade wooden box. When I opened it.. it was as high as this table, probably as big as this table. The box was that big. CORBIN: And what's in it? MERRISH: It's full of documents. I said right away, I said Dr Hamza, this is what I am looking for. HAMZA: So, if it is important paper it wouldn't be in order in this way. CORBIN: Yes, but the inspectors would say this is just the place you would hide documents you didn't want anybody to see, in a rubbish, in a…. HAMZA: It's rubbish things, you know.. this is rubbish. This is one of the report… CORBIN: The papers that were found.. HAMZA: Most of them, 95%, it's old paper, it's nothing to do, it's unreality. CORBIN: But what about the rest of them? HAMZA: The rest of them they are private documents. CORBIN: Did you know immediately that these were scientific papers of a very special kind.. MERRISH: Oh yes. Oh absolutely. CORBIN: .. to do with uranium and ?? enrichment. MERRISH: Oh yes, I could read it, and when it said classified documents… CORBIN: And it said classified documents? MERRISH: Yes, secret. They are bound by the government, it's a government document, and they have a number because they are classified documents. CORBIN: The papers turned out to be about using lasers to enrich uranium for a nuclear bomb, part of Iraq's past weapons programme. Dr Hamza's papers should have been given the inspectors years ago, but the documents have never been disclosed, and neither had they been part of the supposedly full and final declaration given to the UN five weeks before. This inspection gave credence to the claim that Iraqi scientists were keeping sensitive documents at home. The only chance of getting at the truth was to interview scientists either abroad or in private at the Canal Hotel, but everyone the inspectors asked had a standard answer, only in a government ministry with a minder by their side. PERRICOS: It's a certainty they don’t come because they're afraid. And because they had been told.. they are not afraid because they are afraid just by themselves, but they have been told: "You will answer that you are not accepting any interviews except in our own territory. CORBIN: History teaches everyone a lesson. Hussein Kamal, Saddam's son-in- law, the keeper of the special weapons, defected in 1995 and spilled the secrets of the germ warfare programme. But homesick, Kamal returned to Iraq. He and dozens of members of his family were murdered on Saddam's orders. I wondered if the scientists I'd met would talk to the UN in private or go abroad. Would you go? HAMZA: No, certainly not. CORBIN: Why? HAMZA: Because I don’t trust UNMOVIC to start with. CORBIN: You don’t trust UNMOVIC, the UN. HAMZA: The UN… because I have very bad experience with them. Second thing is I don’t feel secure abroad to be honest with you, and I am only feel secure at my country. I don’t like to leave my country. I feel secure whether President Saddam is here more than anybody else. CORBIN: Would you go to speak to them privately? Dr RIHAB TAHA No, I don’t trust the previous inspector and I think it is better for me and for them, and for everybody to have witnesses because I think it is our right and it is a human right that if you don’t want to speak to anybody, no any one obliged you or force you to do that. CORBIN: During my interview with Dr Taha we had several witnesses. Her every word was recorded by two Iraqi officials. AZIZ: Why should they take Iraqi experts outside Iraq? What's the objective behind it. CORBIN: Because they feel they wont talke freely inside Iraq. AZIZ: Free outside their own country? They are a free inside their country. They are free men. CORBIN: As the 12th anniversary of the first Gulf War dawned, Iraqi's gathered in Baghdad's tea shops to hear their leader's televised address. Saddam Hussein's defiance continued. He said his people should again prepared themselves for battle. They would defeat the American aggressor. The bullish speech reinforced the stand Saddam Hussein had taken. The inspectors knew that his intentions to tough it out meant it was unlikely Iraq would ever put it's cards on the table. By now they'd made discoveries which heightened their suspicions, rocket engines which haven't been declared. Chemical shells had turned up in an arsenal empty and unused the Iraqis insisted they'd been overlooked by accident. The aluminium tubes which the US and British intelligence had made so much of were harder to fathom. The Iraqis said they were for conventional rockets. The inspectors agreed it was plausible. But they haven't yet ruled out that the tubes could be used in a centrifuge to enrich Uranium. JACQUES BAUTE Chief Weapons Inspector International Atomic Energy Agency We need more time. We're in the middle of the river, we've made major progress but we're not yet at the stage to draw any conclusion regarding the absence of a nuclear programme in Iraq. January 27, 2003-02-10 United Nations, New York CORBIN: At the end of January the UN gathered to hear the results of the first 60 days of inspections in Iraq. Dr Blix had no smoking gun to report to the Security Council but the mild mannered Swede was harder on the Iraqis than his critics, even the Americans, had expected, and he made it clear Iraq had not yet revealed what had happened to all the anthrax and the nerve gas. BLIX: Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it, and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world. CORBIN: There were deep divisions in the United Nations and public opinion in many countries was increasingly opposed to a war. Influential voices were raised in the council. They argued that giving the inspectors longer for tough 'no holds barred' inspections could contain Saddam Hussein's ambitions to develop weapons of mass destruction, they could thwart his greatest threat of all, his desire to build a nuclear bomb. KOFI ANNAN Secretary General of the United Nations The Security Council has indicated, depending on the evidence that is brought to it, it can declare Iraq in material breach, and following that, they will decide what grave consequences should be taken. I would prefer that we have other means to disarm Iraq than war, and it is quite clear the Inspectors destroyed more weapons of mass destruction than all the bombings that has taken place in Iraq since 1991. CORBIN: America wasn't interested in giving the UN time. The Inspectors would never contain Saddam's weapons, they said, because they'd never find them. The US declared it would present secret intelligence to prove Iraq's guilt. There's real frustration here at the UN. If the Americans have substantive evidence, then why haven't they given it to the Inspectors before. Amongst the Inspectors there's real scepticism that these new revelations will amount to anything at all. Dr HANS BLIX Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC Much of this evidence I think and understand will be circumstantial or will be by inference and it will be personal judgment how convinced are you by it. We will see on Wednesday what Colin Powell has to say. POWELL: This council placed the burden on Iraq to comply and disarm and not on the Inspectors t find that which Iraq has gone out of its way to conceal for so long. Inspectors are inspectors, they are not detectives. CORBIN: The American Secretary of State laid out what he said was evidence before the Council. He claimed Iraq was again playing the old game of hide and seek with the inspectors. Mr Powell produced secret intercepts. POWELL: Listen: (recording of exchange of dialogue in Arabic – translated) COL: Hello. CAPT: Hello. COL: Hello. CAPT: May I help you, Sir? COL: Who is this? Captain Ibrahim? CAPT: I am with you, Sir. COL: Remove. CAPT: Remove.. [repeats instructions] COL: The expression. CAPT: The expression. COL: "Nerve agents." CAPT: "Nerve agents." COL: Wherever it comes up. CAPT: Wherever it comes up. CORBIN: There were spy satellite photos which he said showed sites had been sanitised ready to receive Dr Blix's teams. Mr Powell made it clear he thought inspections were pointless now. US patience with Iraq was almost exhausted. POWELL: We wrote 1441 to give Iraq one last chance. Iraq is not so far taking that one last chance. CORBIN: The Inspectors had already got the message. A weary Dr Blix had told me the week before, he couldn't spin out the inspections any longer. BLIX: Take note of the fact that we had inspection in Iraq for eight years, and thereafter four years we had no inspection at all. Since then we started have had two months. Well that's a rather short time to call it a day, and therefore, if more time were given, yes, I will welcome it. But I cannot in good conscience plead for it. CORBIN: Is that because you feel perhaps even however much time you have, the fact you're not getting the answers from the Iraqis it's futile really. BLIX: That's right. Yes, if you do not have that change of attitude, then it could drag out. CORBIN: This weekend the heads of the UN Inspection Teams went to Baghdad once more to hear the Iraqis promise new cooperation. Scientists had suddenly come forward for private interviews and new documents were handed over. BLIX: I perceived a beginning, more serious attitude and cooperation of substance and I welcome that. Breakthrough is a bit too strong word for what we are seeing, but we are seeing some… CORBIN: There was a hint of even more Iraqi concessions to come just before Dr Blix next briefs the Security Council in five days time. But Iraq's brinkmanship may still offer too little, and this time be too late. People here believe that war is coming. TARIQ AZIZ Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq It will be a bloody war. Yes, they can inflict a lot of losses in the civilian area. But if they decide to invade Iraq, then they will pay a very heavy price. CORBIN: Dr Blix, if your inspectors have to leave Iraq, if war becomes inevitable, wont it show, in effect, that the UN has failed in its mission to peacefully disarm? BLIX: Yes, it's a failure and I certainly would want to have disarmament through the peaceful route of using in sections. But there is only so much you can do. CORBIN: Three months ago when I started out, the Inspectors hoped they could avert a war, but Saddam Hussein has still not been prepared to reveal his secrets. The Inspectors may soon be just a footnote in history as America warns Saddam has thrown away his last chance. Next week on Panorama, "Promises Promises" the first in a series of the state of Britain's public services. John Ware investigates whether Tony Blair's government is living up to its promises on Transport. If you want to comment on tonight's programme write to us at our website: www.bbc.co.uk/panorama CREDITS Reporter Jane Corbin Camera Aleksander Stipic Eric Thirer Mike Spooner Sound Recordist Suzana Yaziljevic VT Editor Boyd Nagle Dubbing Mixer Damian Reynolds Production Co-ordination Rosa Rudnicka Production Team Emma Shaw Web Producer Nathalie Knowles Film Research Kate Redman Research Amanda Vaughan-Barratt Graphic Design Julie Tritton Key Yip Lam Production Manager Helen Cooper Unit Manager Laura Govett Film Editors Mark Senior Assistant Producer Matt Cottingham Co Producer Thea Guest Producer Baghdad John Thynne Producer Darren Kemp Deputy Editors Andrew Bell Sam Collyns Editor Mark Robinson